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Efforts to hold down spending plainly have high priority in government
now. One area often singled out for reductions is the "bureaucracy." This
word, which has developed such negative connotations over the years, has
recently been invested with the character of an anti-Christ.
It was in the political hyperbole of the 1980 Presidential campaign that
the picture of the grossly inefficient, byzantine agglomeration of self-
perpetuating absurdities was painted in all the lurid colors of partisan politics.
Former President Carter had begun a concerted, if ill-starred, attempt to
"clean up" the bureaucratic apparatus that he blamed for so much suffering
and bad policy throughout the country. This rhetoric proved attractive, and
much-heralded programs to "trim the fat" from bloated bureaucratic
organizations were begun with a will. Few social scientists were surprised when
most of these cost-cutting streamlining programs were brought to a screeching
halt many miles short of their objectives. In some respects, Ronald Reagan's
own program to correct these problems has run into similar obstacles. When
attempts to bring down costs succeed, they generally do so at the expense of
lower-level staff, or at the expense of the poor or marginally poor citizen who
could least afford them (Bould and Valdivieso, 1974).
Why have most efforts to reduce the bureaucracy failed so abjectly? Is
there a way to make judicious cuts in bureaucratic organizations that will be
valid and long-lasting? It is the intent of my paper to suggest that such a way
exists, and that this goal may be accomplished within a small time frame and
with minimal expense. The method proposed here makes use of several of the
major insights about bureaucracy that social scientists have accumulated since
the days of Max Weber. Perhaps because no adequate theory has been
developed to make sense from all the facts that have been gathered, there has
been a reluctance to apply existing knowledge in a problem-solving context.
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This project is a departure from that stance in that the method involved ad-
dresses the practical exigencies of reducing the size and cost of bureaucracies.
Since Max Weber initiated the sociological study of the bureaucratic
phenomenon there have been thousands of books and articles written on the
subject. Some have been openly partisan: They declaim the inhumanity of
bureaucratic organizations in moralistic chants and responses. Others have
taken a more "objective" stance and relied on description and the accumula-
tion of data with practically no analysis or conclusions whatever. Still others
have designed programs for the "humanization" of bureaucratic organizations
in which the strategies of the human potential movement are brought to bear
on tiresome situations. In the more popular realm, yet another approach pro-
vides the individual with "survival manuals" with which to navigate the
labyrinth of bureaucratic procedures. But the literature on methods for the ac-
tual dismantling of wasteful, cumbersome, and unpleasant bureaucracies is
scanty, indeed.
Despite the lack of research in the area of cutting down on bureaucracy, it
is rather widely agreed that bureaucracy, at least in the government realm, has
in fact grown to a point so far from optimum size that radical surgery is re-
quired. The precise nature of the subject's anatomical malfunctions must be
ascertained before the "operation" can commence. In this case, the surgery will
be aided by the basic structure of the organization itself, which here refers to
the rules which come to characterize bureaucratic procedure. It is precisely this
feature of bureaucracy which makes it so susceptible to inefficiency, waste,
and irrelevance. The bureaucracy, and the bureaucrat, are guided in their day-
to-day operations by rules. But the social world is full of surprises, and in-
evitably the rules have to be revised or, more frequently, added to. A morass
of frequently meaningless rules emerges, and renders any given operation im-
potent. The problem has varying degrees of severity: the Armed Forces, the
Post Office, the Immigration "service," the Veteran's Administration, and the
various state and local welfare departments are the more notorious among the
offenders. Yet the disorder is endemic to most bureaucratic organizations.
Lately it has been the fashion to lampoon bureaucracies. Senator Proxmire
has handed out his "Golden Fleece" award to many an embarrassed recipient.
The Washington Monthly publishes its Memo of the Month book in which the
most absurd, arcane, and redundant communiques between government func-
tionaries are reprinted in all their comic-opera detail. But this nervous laughter
about the petty foibles of bureaucracy masks the enormously threatening spec-
tre that looms on the horizon: an administered world which has become so
top-heavy and so wasteful that it stifles every positive and creative initiative in
a quagmire of counter-productive controls and rules. Robert Merton (1968)
summarizes the bureaucratic dilemma thus:
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1. Bureaucracy demands the same response to situations and strict
devotion to the rules.
2. Bureaucracy leads to an absolute devotion to the rules, thus los-
ing track of the purpose of the rules.
3. Situations arise which are not covered by the rules.
4. The very elements which make for efficiency and rationality in
some situations may produce just the opposite results under dif-
ferent conditions.
Merton's stress on the rule-making and rule-following aspects of
bureaucracy will act as the starting point of the method proposed here.
"Bureaucide: A Method for Organizational Disassembly" approaches the
problem of an overgrown bureaucracy from the standpoint of reducing its size
by "over-enforcing" its rules until the weight of procedural impediments forces
a structural breakdown and effects an actual "disassembly" of the unit through
the avenue of its own nonfunctional rules. A chief executive taking this tack
may well have met with greater success than Mr. Carter, whose attempts to
reduce bureaucratic waste required the setting up of yet another office to
superintend the overall cost-cutting. As one might predict, very little was ac-
complished, save the creation of an extra addition to the Washington family of
government offices.
Before the method can begin to be applied, several problems must be
resolved. Among these are: How does one identify bureaucracies which re-
quire disassembly? How can one select for enforcement the rules which will
net the greatest result? How can the method be applied with surgical precision
to avoid harming valuable personnel and viable institutions? These and other
questions must be thoroughly addressed so as to ensure maximum effec-
tiveness in the disassembly process, while guarding against a "meat axe" ap-
proach which can only do harm in the long run. This paper will present the
core elements of this ongoing project.
BETWEEN TERRORISM AND TOKENISM
The past gives certain concrete lessons about attempts to limit the size and
growth of bureaucratic organizations. Today bureaucracy is frequently con-
ceptualized as "lifeless," "faceless," "impersonal," and "neutered" (Crozier,
1964). Its mindlessness and lack of direction are, at least in the eye of the
beholder and outsider, relatively new perceptions. Bureaucracy in its modern
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form was created in the mid-eighteenth century as the servant of the state and
modeled on the army. This was a time of "enlightened despots" like Frederick
of Prussia and Joseph of Austria who used the state bureaucracy as a weapon
against competing interests in their respective countries (Jacoby, 1976: 28-35).
In this era the bureaucracy was "mindless" only insofar as it was founded and
organized on Teutonic military principles. For the Beamte to question the
order that crossed his desk was no less detestable than the second Lieutenant's
refusal to charge headlong into the enemy (Presthus, 1962: 49). It was cow-
ardice under fire in both cases. Hence, the state bureaucracies were perceived
with accuracy as extensions of royal power and it was on these premises that
they were attacked.
At the one extreme of attempts to disassemble bureaucracies is terroristic
and revolutionary violence. It was popular well into the twentieth century,
especially under the auspices of anarchist inspiration from the pens of
Bakunin, Proudhon, and Kropotkin. In these rudimentary and primitive at-
tempts at bureaucide, horrific and often murderous violence was employed to
bring down the apparatus of the state. Apart from a bloodthirsty system of
ethics, it also proved to be a failure in practical terms. This frightfully
amateurish and morally culpable approach to disassembling bureaucracies
was born under the dark star of Utopian longings. It was a wholly romantic
assertion of will, and totally unsuited to the complex and demanding job it
undertook.
A more familiar, slightly more sophisticated, and similarly ineffective ap-
proach to the problem can be found in the various reform attempts that issue
from within the bureaucracies themselves. This is not to say that a given
department, office, or division itself organizes and administers a paring down
of its own operation. This may happen, but it is rather unusual. More often a
watchdog agency or outside consulting outfit is called in to perform the
surgery. The techniques of most of these operations are familiar to the casual
reader of the Wall Street Journal. The contractor is most often a local "human
relations" think tank with a skeleton core staff and scores of occasional part-
timers who are swiftly recruited for the job and just as swiftly let go. The
specific techniques designed to "enrich jobs," to promote happiness and lessen
on-the-job frictions are well-known and differ only in detail from one another.
They are in effect softcore extensions of Taylorism, smoothed out and dressed
up with pseudo-science jargon by corporate mind technicians like Robert Ford
of AT & T and Scott Myers of Texas Instruments. What they have in common
above all is the attempt to increase productivity from employees whose
dependency and incompetence are considered a priori (Perrow, 1972: 98-143).
Along a similar line operates the cluster of techniques generally called
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Management by Objective, pioneered by Peter Drucker in the 1950s. Here the
goal is not so much job enrichment as it is to effect cooperation from two fun-
damentally antagonistic camps, labor and management, wi th attendant loss of
ident i ty in the all-powerful organization (Perrow, 1972: 61-95). To this could
be added Sensitivity Training, Transactional Analysis, Behavior Modifica-
tion, and a dozen other approaches which are designed to smooth out the
wrinkles of personality, status, and economic conflict in the workplace.
Whether or not any of these techniques actually deliver what they promise is a
moot point, especially since the consultants who normally undertake this k ind
of work build the need for "follow-ups" into their programs, thus assuring
continued patronage from the afflicted bureaucracy. So while the malady may
be said to lessen in intensity, the best the patient can hope for is to go into
remission (Thompson, 1975: 31). Cures, even if available, would force the
clinicians to close up shop.
The results of these treatments in the private sector bureaucracies are
hard enough to determine, but not impossible since the growth or shrinkage of
profit margins can act as a rough indicator (Reif and Luthans, 1972: 30-37). In
government, however, it is v i r tua l ly impossible to assess the impact of such
programs. This is because the various Federal, State, and local bureaucracies
neither "produce" tangible goods, nor do they measure their success or failure
in terms of "profit" or "loss." In fact, the criteria for success or failure issue
either from the office i tself , or from another office within the same overall
agency or department. The standards of "production," "efficiency," and "goal
at tainment" are subject neither to the marketplace nor to other real-world
forces. The bureaucracy is its own reason for existence, and it fine tunes its
performance to conform to internal criteria.
This constellation of attempts to l imit , improve, and streamline
bureaucracy has a sideshow aspect. It is tokenism in its most manipulative and
most benign guise. Its rank manipulation of people and situations is recognized
as such by almost everyone involved. There may even be some limited enter-
tainment value present. Also wi th in the classification of tokenism is budgetary
cost-cutting. Here the accountants take over, and blue pencil everything that is
"frivolous" and "non-essential;" at least that is how it works out in theory. In
June of 1980 the results of three years of then-President Carter's hard-nosed
cost-cutting of the Federal bureaucracy were announced. Only a half dozen
offices were actually excised from the roster of government agencies, and these
dealt with the purest bureau t r iv ia imaginable: The people who administer a
miniscule office on the aesthetics of the American flag had their appropria-
tions slashed to the very bone, as did an obscure bureau that was s t i l l working
out Spanish land grant claims in California.
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Now there is more bureaucracy because of all the GS-14s that were hired
in the past few years. It was their job to administer the cuts, and their own
Wrings were "hidden" from public scrutiny by making their appointments
"temporary" and "provisional" at the outset, although most are by now full-
time employees of the government. It would be wrong to blame these
employees for wanting a decent job, a secure position, and a reasonable in-
come. In a real sense they are just as victimized by the system as the harried
civil servants they were hired to eliminate.
The cleverness of bureaucracies in increasing employee numbers,
budgets, and power in general is amply illustrated by the imaginative
strategies used in short-circuiting plans to cut back on personnel (Altheide and
Johnson, 1980: 77-80). Some examples of this include the practice of hiring
two part-timers to replace one full-time position, hiring people to work for 39
hours per week, thus maintaining the "part time" status, misclassifying
employees as "temporary," and dropping employees from the payroll records
at times when the auditors make checks. It has been estimated that about
165,000 people are employed through one or more of these gambits. The Cen-
sus Bureau, the Social Security Administration, the Forest Service, HUD, and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs seem to be the worst offenders. The resounding
success of this mammoth subterfuge was borne out when President Reagan,
shortly after his election, announced a hiring freeze on government jobs. An
embarrased chief executive was chagrined to learn that just such a freeze had
been in effect for years.
It is fairly safe to assume that the Presidential attempts to trim down the
size of bureaucracy have long ago come to be regarded as mere campaign
rhetoric by the majority of people. Although this highly advertised assault on
bureaucracy can be discounted as tokenism, the various tax cutting initiatives
that began with California's Proposition 13 in July, 1978, cannot. As of this
writing, the so-called "taxpayers' revolt" has lost some of its initial momen-
tum, but the use of this drastic method is, in all probability, not to be dis-
counted. Now it is allied with the proposed Constitutional Amendment to
balance the budget, and enjoys tremendous support from corporate interests.
And with good reason: The property tax relief was a windfall for the largest
property owners. For every dollar saved by the over-taxed elderly couple try-
ing to hold onto their home, several millions were realized by utilities,
manufacturers, and agricultural interests.
This attempt to cut bureaucracy results in eliminating services to people
who can least afford to lose them. The jobs that are cut will typically affect not
bureaucrats holding sinecures, but janitors, clerk-typists, and maintenance
people. This approach was echoed by President Carter's attempts to lower
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social security payments to people who could supposedly afford to do without
them. In 1978 this was translated into an attempt to eliminate such payments
to widows with children in college. Although the measure was withdrawn
under heavy fire, it illustrates the cruelty that can issue from politically oppor-
tunistic and insensitive approaches to bureaucide. This, too, is tokenism in
that nothing really changes in the bureaucracy, but it is tokenism in a most
malignant form insofar as it victimizes the perennial "innocent bystander"
while purposely missing the real target.
What I have discussed here are admittedly the extremes: There are indeed
other approaches which fall in between them, such as Alvin Toffler's predic-
tion, made ten years ago, that we are witnessing "the breakdown of
bureaucracy." Toffler believed that in the new "ad-hocracy" people would
escape from "being trapped in some unchanging, personality-smashing niche."
The human being would instead find itself "liberated, a stranger in a now free-
form world of kinetic landscapes." He saw a return to free-wheeling en-
trepreneurship, nineteenth-century style, as the new adhocracy assembled an
exciting, venturesome, liberated world (Toffler, 1971: 125-126, 148). The pa-
tent silliness of this confused prognosis is certainly not the worst of its genre,
but a more thorough examination of its competitors is not possible here.
THE SEARCH FOR A METHOD
Although famous for his development of the F scale, Theodor Adorno is
better known in Europe as an originator and exponent of the theory of an "ad-
ministered world." In this framework, which really has more of the qualities of
a vision than a formal theory, a nightmare of bureaucratic controls is assembl-
ed by the sinister forces of a managed society. Adorno simply carried Max
Weber's predictions about the rationalized, bureaucratized, "disenchanted"
world a few steps further toward its firmly pessimistic conclusion: i.e., all
forms of social life were to be frozen in the deadly embrace of bureaucratic ac-
countability. There was no villain in this scenario, because this is just the way
things turned after the events of a thousand years ago set an inexorable process
in motion. And there is no escape from the administered world since even the
modes of escape are themselves developed and distributed by bureaucratic
machinery. What results is a sociology of despair, and all attempts at halting
or turning back the growth of bureaucratic control are dismissed as doomed
from the outset (Greisman and Ritzer, 1981). This view, which is enjoying in-
creasing acceptance in some circles, overlooks the potential weaknesses in-
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herent in the bureaucratic phenomenon, and it is upon these weaknesses that a
bureaucide method can be based.
The fundamental weakness of bureaucracy resides in one of its essential
properties - rules - an enormous codex of faithfully recorded, selectively en-
forced, frequently ignored rules which constitute the legal system of every pet-
ty bureaucratic fiefdom that the administered world has spawned (Crozier,
1964). As part of the legitimating function, that is, in order to make executive
caprice or the desire of powerful interests more acceptable to employees and
the general public, bureaucracies develop impressive reserves of supposedly in-
violate rules (Weber, 1947). The superabundance of rules is dictated largely by
the belief, which seems to be endemic to bureaucracies, that each and every
possible situation can be handled by a given rule. It is just a question of fram-
ing enough rules to cover all these contingencies. Hence, the National Labor
Relations Board in Washington distributed an administrative bulletin which
set down the rules and procedures to be followed by employees should the na-
tion's capital be the target of a nuclear attack. With deadpan earnestness the
memo laid out all the proper steps to be followed so that work could go on
despite the inconvenience of an atomic holocaust (Peters and O'Neil, 1973:
33). For every rule that is made to cover extraordinary situations, dozens are
typically promulgated to cover day-to-day commonsense circumstances.
Many of these rules exist because of an initiative tied to personal ambition.
Bureaucrats who want to advance in an organization will try to win points by
starting projects, initiating "improvements," or tracking down deviants. These
attempts are frequently translated into policy, and eventually become rules.
Long after the given bureaucrat has been promoted and retired, the brainchild
remains on the books, and assumes a fossilized and thoroughly nonfunctional
character.
The idea of following the rules to the very letter as a way of making a
statement or winning an advantage from a given organization has been im-
plemented in the past, although the goals of such actions have little to do with
the bureaucide here proposed. Perhaps the best-known instance of this rigid
adherence to all rules as a weapon is the so-called "rule book slowdown" which
was until recently the tactic favored by air traffic controllers (Weinstein, 1979:
95-7). Every so often a dispute over wages and benefits came up between the
controllers in the tower and the airlines. If negotiations stalled, the controllers
staged a rule book slowdown instead of striking. By reporting to work and do-
ing just what the rule book called for and nothing else, the controllers were
able to bring air traffic to a virtual standstill, while continuing to receive their
paychecks. (These tactics contrast sharply with the disastrous confrontation
methods employed during 1981.)
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Some bureaucracies are extraordinarily old, permeated by nepotism and
antiquated redundancies, and hopelessly inefficient. Yet within these same
criteria, some are worth saving. The old Post Office Department was one such
organization. Reorganized as a "public corporation" and renamed the U.S.
Postal Service, it has been greatly modernized since its inception in 1969.
Thousands of cost-ineffective rural post offices have been eliminated, modern
machinery has replaced outdated sorting and cancelling methods, and new
personnel policies have streamlined the ponderous hiring, promotion, and in-
centive programs of the old Post Office Department. The result of all this
tampering has been much worse service at much greater expense. The idea of
centralizing postal districts has not worked, the new machinery, special-
ordered at great expense, eats packages and letters with gusto; millions of
postal patrons miss the convenience of their local post office; employees,
dissatisfied with management gimmicks, have struck on several occasions,
operating costs have skyrocketed, the prospect of curtailed deliveries is in the
offing, and the very thought of a nine-digit zip code has businessmen worried
over the next disaster to befall their mailings. Before the business-school
surgeons operated, the old Post Office Department was a model of quaintly
absurd nineteenth century procedures which for some reason, still secret,
managed to serve two hundred million people with lackluster predictability. Its
replacement sought to impose space age technology on a service conceived by
antediluvian minds. The results are plain to those who receive a piece of chewed
up mail inside a brown envelope which is stamped "damaged mail," just so
there is no doubt about the actual condition of one's correspondence.
Just because a bureaucracy is antiquated and outdated does not necessari-
ly mean it should be eliminated or even tampered with. By the same token,
brand-new bureaucracies can be worse than their century-old counterparts. A
prime example of this is the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
another "public corporation" put together by the Nixon Administration. Its
mission was to restore some semblance of life to the moribund remnants of the
passenger train network which once functioned with efficiency under private
ownership. Although it was created only in 1971, Amtrak has become a model
for what not to do in countless ways. Many people on its governing board
know absolutely nothing about railroads; its procurement methods are
devastatingly slow and prone to massive errors; it is the focus of a half-dozen
probes on corruption charges, and despite massive federal subsidies, has failed
to restore U.S. passenger service to what it was in the 1940s. As relatively new
as it is, Amtrak and its sister bureaucracy, the Northeast Corridor Improve-
ment Program, walk away with awards for waste and red tape (Greisman,
1980).
Within the criteria of size and efficiency, one also must consider
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organizations that are pitifully understaffed and manage to provide essential
services. Naturally, these would hardly qualify for bureaucide, but may merit
attention as exact opposites of waste and inefficiency. Hence, the selection of
the organization must proceed with care and caution. Only with surgical preci-
sion can advocates of bureaucide move to dismantle targeted bureaucracies.
Anything less than exquisite care in this area can result in enormous hardships
for both employees and those whom the bureaucracy ostensibly services.
Step Two: Compiling Rules. Bureaucracies by definition place a premium on
codified rules and procedures. Reliance on written rules has effectively in-
sulated bureaucracies from substantive change for many years, and the
frustrating response to an innovative suggestion, "we've never done this
before," aptly illustrates the historic resistance of bureaucracies to change.
Much of this resistance issues from the private interests and desires of the
bureaucrats in managerial positions, but the concrete manifestation of these
interests shows itself in rules and their selective enforcement. The relevance of
all this to bureaucide is that a reasonable amount of organizational
disassembly can be hoped for by the thorough enforcement of certain of these
rules which may be either long forgotten, or honored more in the breech than
the observance.
It was noted earlier how "work-to-the-rule" actions by unions had achieved
limited gains without resorting to strikes. The labor interests were concerned
with the continuing function of the organization, since it was to the organiza-
tion that they owed their livelihood. Predictably, few if any departments or
businesses have been actually destroyed by such actions. Bureaucide picks up
where these approaches leave off; it pushes the point so far that some kind of
massive breakdown occurs. The goal, it should be recalled, is not the interim
chaos that results, but the long-term rebuilding on a smaller scale and along
more rational and humanized lines.
For those familiar with the extraordinary resiliency of bureaucracies in
general, this proposal may seen too Utopian. But bureaucracy's resiliency is
matched by its overall structural rigidity, especially when means against it are
employed from within. To picture such a situation one can draw on the
registration procedures common to most colleges and universities in America.
Those faculty who are not obliged to donate their time and energy to these
twice-yearly exercises are dimly aware from personal memory and from stu-
dent grumblings that registration is a nerve-wracking process of considerable
complexity and overlong duration. Most people who have gone through it
scarcely believe that it is really finished once it ends. It is the academic
bureaucracy swaggering about in all its obscene plumage. Now it only remains
to consider what an Achilles heel this process is. Anyone wishing to effect
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drastic reforms in this process need only consult its rules. One set of rules
governing this process concerns prerequisites. Most college courses above the
introductory level require one or more of them, but it is only a tiny minority of
faculty (the number is smallest at the largest schools with the biggest classes)
who take the time to enforce these. If these prerequisite rules were to be
followed to the letter in a large state university of 20-30,000 students, registra-
tion would go on for weeks, as students, faculty and administration wore out
frazzled nerves in an attempt to get classes started amidst the thundering
bureaucratic fiasco.
The example of a university registration is used only to make the effect of
rule enforcement graphic. The unpleasantness of these procedures is merely
annoying and is hardly to be considered harmful. Nonetheless, this example
demonstrates what can be done on the governmental level as well. To take
another hypothetical case, consider the frequently ignored rules regarding the
allocation of square footage, desks, phones, and other office furniture to
government functionaries on the basis of rank. Nothing could be more
evocative of the Prussianized origins of modern bureaucracy, and the overall
and forceful enforcement of these regulations would surely result in ad-
ministrative havoc as frantic bureaucrats scrambled to move people around in
a desperate attempt to bring everything into compliance with the rules.
The success or failure of this rule-enforcing technique depends in large
degree on the willingness of the supervisory authority (president, governor,
mayor) to permit an outside group of consultants free reign for a limited time.
These specially trained people would be the real practitioners of bureaucide.
Recruited from the private sector, they would have no connection with the
bureaucracy, and their mandate must be total in its ability to strictly and
thoroughly enforce the rules of the bureaucracy itself. This is akin to the grant-
ing of special powers for a brief period of time. Only under these cir-
cumstances can the method proposed here succeed; the attempt to enforce
rules from outside fails, and essays in reform from within are likewise doomed.
It is only the special status of the consultant as "outsiders with inside power"
which grants bureaucide a chance for success.
Step Three: Supervising Organizational Collapse. What happens to a hide-
bound, ossified bureaucracy which for decades has been virtually immune to
change and innovation? What effect will bureaucide have upon the middle-
management people who have hitherto ruled their fiefdoms with the smug ar-
rogance of feudal princes? What will be the response of the dozens of marginal
and lower-level bureaucrats whose ambitions and designs have for years been
frustrated by the powers-that-were? It should be openly admitted that the ef-
fect of bureaucide could be usetting for many people. The mildly "burotic"
88 CLINICAL SOCIOLOGY REVIEW/1982
personality could become "bureaupathic" in a trice (Thompson, 1975:
170-177). The dammed-up frustrations and anxieties of the past could burst
through the weakened barriers and engulf the target organization in a deluge
of collective hysteria. The psychic effects to be produced should not be
underestimated, since when the cherished rituals and structures of a given
world collapse, the mental structures which drew sustenance from them
likewise topple in a staccato burst of spasmodic seizures.
A critical ingredient is the provision of a guarantee at the very outset of
the collapse stage, that no one's job will be lost and no one's salary will be cut.
It should be recalled that the aim of bureaucide is to create more effective and
responsive organizations, not to axe the jobs of people who are marginally
useless and create thereby human misery at the savings of a few paltry GS-13
salaries to the public coffers. To do otherwise would amount to "blaming the
victim." Alfred McClung Lee has pointed out that the private sector has been
unable to provide any reasonable level of job security for its employees, so
people's survival instincts have sent them scurrying to the bureaucratized
pigeon holes of civil service. The "flight" from the private sector is intensified
as jobs are lost to foreign competition and by technological advances which
make skills redundant. In this kind of economic climate, the victims try to
"hide" in the bureaucracy where luck, connections, or just a "low profile"
might land them a sinecure that is immune to the fluctuations of the
marketplace (Lee, 1966: 230-244).
Written assurance of job security should short circuit the collective ner-
vous breakdown which can predictably accompany or sabotage any really ef-
fective bureaucide operation. Also, a staff of clinical sociologists should be
placed on hand to deal with any unpleasant symptoms that might come up as a
response to all the stress. This need can be inferred from the increasing amount
of suicides and outwardly directed violence that has accompanied recent at-
tempts to "reform" the Federal bureaucracy. The vicious beating given the
young woman sent to streamline the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, and the six-story plunge of a downgraded GS-12 from the Agriculture
Department serve as reminders of the sensitivity of bureacrats to any change in
their routine. They are more psychologically vulnerable than their counter-
parts in the corporate bureaucracy, where job security is typically traded-off
for higher salaries, and the edging out of faithful long-time employees by
young go-getters is an established practice.
Step Four: Operation Retrieval. The anarchist wishes to destroy all govern-
ment organizations once and for all. The labor organizer seeks to push
organizations to the brink of inconvenience to elicit limited gains. Bureaucide
aims at the discrete dismantling of specific organizations so that they can be
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reconstituted on different premises, or eliminated altogether if the situation
warrants. In no case will an employee be fired, edged out, downgraded, or
otherwise harmed in terms of making a living and having secure expectations
for the future. Despite these assurances, people are bound to be unhappy. But
there will be those who welcome, for whatever reasons, the bureaucide pro-
cedure, and it is arguable that some of these people can assist in reassembling
the organizaton under a new mandate. The talents of these people should be
utilized, as should the contributions of the people whom the bureaucracy is
supposed to serve but seldom serves very well.
The fact that most bureacracies have lost touch with their actual task vis-
a-vis the taxpayer is now a truism. Not long ago, at a luncheon with two
government attorneys at the much-maligned Department of Energy, this was
made rather clear to me. Both men agreed that DOE would continue to
rubber-stamp the demands of the oil companies and translate them into public
policy. This was "inevitable" since the executive branch had become convinced
that it was far easier to control several hundred million private citizens than a
dozen enormously powerful corporations. But DOE was hardly ruthless, and
performed a very vital function: It provided support for its employees and
their families. This appears cynical only to the outsider; for the bureaucrat
such sentiments constitute the logic of survival. Hummel (1977: 3) concep-
tualized these as the public misunderstandings of the bureaucrat, and the
private misunderstandings of the bureaucracy itself. For example:
Public Perception Bureaucratic Reality
Socially —
Bureaucrats deal with people. Bureaucrats deal with cases.
Linguistically —
Communication with bureau- Bureaucrats find it in their
crats is possible; we all interest to define how and
speak the same language. when communication will
take place; they create their
own secret languages.
Politically —
Public bureaucracies are Public bureaucracies are
service institutions. control institutions.
Bureaucide hopes to achieve the modest gains of making the bureaucracy
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somewhat more responsive to its constituency, as well as making it more effi-
cient and cost-effective overall. Within these general goals there will be a thou-
sand detailed goals for each and every bureaucracy that is targeted for
bureaucide, and the specific outlines of the method under discussion here.
Step Four is the most challenging and the most promising stage of this method.
If bureaucide works, and there is no way of determining that now, then a gen-
uine opportunity for substantial positive change will be presented.
SUMMARY
Among the more traditional opponents of the state are those associating
themselves with some variety of Marxian outlook. Central to many of these
positions has been the idea of the "withering away of the state." As desirable as
such a happening might be, there is precious little evidence to indicate that
anything of the kind will happen in the foreseeable future, unless of course,
"withering" is taken in a more literal context and we picture the grotesque spec-
tacle of hollow skeletons slumped over their office desks after a neutron bomb
assault. Ruling out this horrific possibility, a trend which indicates just the op-
posite of any withering away seems to be occurring: The bureaucracy is grow-
ing and proliferating on every level. Washington, D.C., the epicenter of this
growth, was within recent memory a dull and dowdy city, described sar-
castically by the Kennedys as embodying "northern charm and southern effi-
ciency." Washington is now a city of expensive restaurants, flashy discos, ex-
clusive neighborhoods, and scarce housing second only to that of southern
California in price.
Government expansion has created some of this, but it is not the clerk-
typist who dines at Rive Gauche, nor is it the GS-12 at the Commerce Depart-
ment who buys a home in Kenwood. Rather, it is corporations, foreign
business interests, pressure groups, and just "special interests" in general that
have been drawn to Washington because of the growing power of the
bureaucracy. They want to have their voices heard, and they come to the city
with the specific intention of spending large amounts of money in strategic
places. The much-discussed division between the public and private sectors is
becoming academic as the lines between corporate interests and public policy
blur. The bureaucracy is growing, and just how fast this is happening is dif-
ficult to determine, since literally thousands of employees' names are inten-
tionally and systematically hidden from public record through the byzantine
accounting procedures of the bureaucracy itself (Washington Post, August 16,
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1979: 1). Washington is a boom town, and no one seems worried about the
bubble bursting; if there is a severe depression, the government will just hire
more people, and for the astute investor, things will just get better and better.
Conservatives attempt to defeat this bureaucratic growth with tax-cutting
schemes like Proposition 13 and the amendment to balance the budget. As
already noted, tactics like these usually penalize the victim, and as for a
balanced budget, massive tax increases can accomplish this rather swiftly. The
radical solution, barring a revolution, is to sabotage the bureaucracy from
outside. This underestimates the organization's resiliency, and fails. As for the
more orthodox Marxist idea of the state withering away after (or before) a
takeover by the proletariat, such Utopian longings appear pathetic beside the
more stoic observations of Max Weber, T. W. Adorno, and Henry Jacoby. We
are approaching the day of the totally managed society, the administered
world so chillingly depicted by novelists like George Orwell and Aldous Hux-
ley thirty years ago, and which is now coming to fruition in the Soviet Union.
When L'Enfant laid out the plans for the new capital of the United States dur-
ing the Eighteenth Century, he included provision for a port, since in those
days a city wholly dependent on government for its existence was unthinkable.
Now the bureaucracy sustains itself without any industry whatsoever, and it
would appear as though bureaucratic growth and inefficiency are limited only
by global resources.
The thesis underlying the bureaucide method is that the bureaucracy will
be the very last thing to wither away, and that the way to make it more respon-
sive to human needs is to disassemble it, using its own backlog of rules as a
tool. This method can be criticized on the grounds that its departs from due
process in its endowing outsiders with inside power. It can be viewed as naively
Utopian or as a mere cover for anarchist sympathies. Notwithstanding these
objections, the author offers it as a "modest proposal" which, while it may not
be able to do away with all of the wicked aspects of bureaucracy, may in fact
net some provocative results.
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